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I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, corporate commentators and policymakers have given
increasing attention to the duties of and potential for imposing liability on
corporate officers, as distinct from directors. In response, in part, to the alleged
corporate malfeasance that led to the events at WorldCom and Enron, the
federal government put in place the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an effort to increase
officer accountability and impose legal responsibilities on these individuals.1
Similarly, post-Enron, regulatory agencies and stock exchanges such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), and Nasdaq, adopted procedures designed to promote greater legal
accountability not only with respect to officers, but also the directors who are
responsible for overseeing the actions of officers.2 More recently, and even
before the causes and impact of the financial crisis have been fully understood,
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1. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.S.) (2005); see also
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2004) (discussing regulation of director and officer conduct under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Larry Catá Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for Officer,
Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 897, 897 (2002) (discussing the effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act following corporate scandals).
2. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 1 (discussing steps taken by the SEC, the NYSE, and Nasdaq
and the interplay of federal reform with state fiduciary duty law); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 45657 (2004) (“In the post-Enron era, there has been considerable
discussion about what went wrong at Enron and elsewhere and how to fix it. Congress passes the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the New York Stock Exchange adopted new corporate regulations introducing
new checks and balances, and other self-regulatory organizations followed suit.”).
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lawmakers have sought to address the perceived misjudgments and lack of
accountability of corporate officers.3 Amid these calls for increased scrutiny and
regulation of the behavior of corporate executives, corporate scholars and
commentators have been focused on the proper standards by which to judge the
fiduciary duties of officers and how to impose liability for the breach of such
duties, in particular noting that, until recently, there was a lack of definitive
guidance from the Delaware courts on the issue.4
The fiduciary duties of officers is addressed, in differing degrees, under
Delaware law, the law frequently applied to corporate-governance disputes, and
under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA). As a general matter, both
Delaware law and the MBCA provide that the fiduciary duties of corporate
officers are essentially the same as those owed by directors. The MBCA
provides for such duties by statute, specifying express conduct requirements of
officers.5 By contrast, Delaware’s approach to fiduciary duties is grounded in
common law and contains no such particularized statutory guidance.6 While
each of these bodies of corporate law impose essentially the same fiduciary
obligations on officers and directors, the MBCA and Delaware’s corporate
statute, the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (General
Corporation Law), differ in what statutory protections are provided to officers
in fulfilling their fiduciary obligations.
In discharging their fiduciary duties, directors under both the MBCA and
the General Corporation Law are generally protected from personal liability if,
in making business decisions, they reasonably rely on the reports and records of
officers, employees, advisors, and experts of the corporation. The statutes
diverge, however, in whether this safe harbor should be extended to the officers
of a corporation, whether they are non-director officers or directors acting in
their capacity as officers. The MBCA provides that officers may be protected
when their actions are taken in reliance on the other employees and outside
advisors and experts of the corporation, while the reliance protections set forth
in the General Corporation Law are available only to directors. This article
3. See Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Business Law Corporate Governance
Committee on Delineation of Governance Roles and Responsibilities, 65 BUS. LAW. 107, 110 n.3 (2009);
see, e.g., Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/new_website/Bill%20Text%20%20Shareholders%20Bill%20of%20Rig
hts%20Act%20of%202009.pdf.
4. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary
Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1106 (2009) (“For all their undoubted significance, however, corporate
officers receive scant attention in the world of corporate law.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon,
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) (“Hardly
a week goes by without yet another Delaware decision addressing the subject of director duties. Yet,
surprisingly, no Delaware decision has ever clearly articulated the subject of officer duties and judicial
standards for reviewing their discharge.”); A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992) (“The precise
nature of the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a topic that has received
little attention from courts and commentators.”).
5. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2008).
6. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 70809 (Del. 2009).
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discusses the differing approaches of the MBCA and the General Corporation
Law and the considerations underlying the extension of a reliance safe harbor
to officers.
II
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS
A. Officer Fiduciary Duties Under the MBCA
Under the MBCA, a corporation may have such officers as are described in
its bylaws or as are appointed by the board of directors in accordance with the
bylaws.7 With respect to the fiduciary obligations of these individuals, section
8.42 of the MBCA sets forth a comprehensive statement of the expected
standards of officer conduct, which are generally the same as those imposed on
directors of a corporation. Specifically, an officer has a duty to act “(1) in good
faith; (2) with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise
under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation.”8 In addition to imposing directorlike standards of conduct, the MBCA also introduces concepts from agency law,
adding a duty of obedience to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by
an officer.9
Further, while implicit in the broad standards of conduct provided for in
section 8.42(a), and in part in response to the upheavals involving public
corporations such as Enron, the MBCA was amended in 2005 to address an
officer’s duties with respect to disclosure of information to the board of
directors. The amendment, set forth in section 8.42(b), provides that an officer’s
duty of disclosure includes the obligation (1) to inform superior corporate
authorities, such as a superior officer to whom the officer reports, the board of
directors, or a committee of the board, of any material information that is
within the scope of the officer’s functional responsibilities, and (2) to inform the
relevant superior corporate authority or another appropriate person of material
violations of law or material breaches of duty to the corporation by an officer,
employee, or agent, that the officer believes have occurred or are likely to
occur.10 The rationale underlying the addition of section 8.42(b) was that, by
specifically setting forth certain reporting requirements as part of officers’
fiduciary duties, the type of wrongdoings that were uncovered only after the
fact in Enron-type situations could potentially be mitigated or avoided.

7.
8.
9.
10.

See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(a) (2008).
Id. § 8.42(a).
See id. § 8.42 cmt. at 8-346.
Id. § 8.42(b).
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B. Officer Fiduciary Duties Under Delaware Law
In contrast to the MBCA, Delaware law does not impose fiduciary duties on
officers by statute. Rather, the nature and contours of Delaware fiduciary duties
arise out of common law.11 But while Delaware law contains a well-developed
set of standards, both in case law and statute, to govern the conduct of
corporate directors, the law pertaining to the fiduciary obligations of officers, by
comparison, is sparse.12 In the seminal 1939 case of Guth v. Loft, the Delaware
Supreme Court first articulated the broad proposition that officers owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders.13 Over forty years later,
the Delaware Supreme Court again mentioned the concept of an officer’s
fiduciary duties when it noted that “[p]ractically all jurisdictions recognize a
fiduciary relationship arising from the directors and officers to their corporation
and to the stockholders . . . .”14 Subsequent decisions in the Delaware Court of
Chancery relied on the Delaware Supreme Court’s generalized declaration in
Guth in stating generally that an officer owes the same fiduciary duties as
directors, but failed to develop this concept any further.15
Accordingly, based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s statements in Guth,
courts and commentators had, until recently, operated under the assumption
that the duties owed by corporate officers were the same as those of directors.16

11. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(“Delaware fiduciary duties are based in common law and have been carefully crafted to define the
responsibilities of directors and managers, as fiduciaries, to the corporation.”). With respect to a
corporation’s officers, Delaware law does provide statutorily that “[e]very corporation organized under
this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a
resolution of the board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2010).
12. See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 4, at 1106 n.6.
13. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating that “[c]orporate officers and directors . . .
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders”).
14. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 50203 (Del. 1981) (quoting Mansfield
Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 1959)). The Delaware Court of
Chancery had also only addressed the issue of officer fiduciary duties in dicta, stating that officers and
directors each owe fiduciary duties, without further expanding on that proposition. See, e.g., Copi of
Del., Inc. v. Kelly, No. 14529, 1996 WL 633302, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1996) (“Officers and directors of
a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders.”); Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1989 WL 79963, at
*4 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (“Delaware law is clear that a fiduciary duty is owed to the shareholders of a
corporation by the officers and directors of the corporation . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1275 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating that “an officer owes
to the corporation identical fiduciary duties of care and loyalty as owed by directors”); Midland Grange
No. 27 Patrons of Husbandry v. Walls, No. 2155-VCN, 2008 WL 616239, at *7 n.32 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28,
2008) (“Thus, regardless of whether the Officer Respondents are properly characterized as ‘officers’ of
the Grange or ‘directors’ of the Grange, ‘[t]he fiduciary duties an officer owes to the corporation “have
been assumed to be identical to those of directors.”’”) (alteration in original) (quoting In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004)); Ryan v.
Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 269 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No.
15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) (citations omitted) (“To date, the fiduciary
duties of officers have been assumed to be identical to those of directors.”).
16. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1600 (“[C]ourts and commentators routinely describe
the duties of directors and officers together, and in identical terms.”); Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note
4, at 217 (“Nonetheless, most authorities suggest that, as a general proposition, corporate officers owe
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In early 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court in Gantler v. Stephens confirmed
this assumption by explicitly holding that corporate officers’ fiduciary duties are
the same as those owed by directors:
The Court of Chancery has held, and the parties do not dispute, that corporate officers
owe fiduciary duties that are identical to those owed by corporate directors. That
issue—whether or not officers owe fiduciary duties identical to those of directors—has
been characterized as a matter of first impression for this Court. In the past, we have
implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of
17
directors. We now explicitly so hold.

Applying this holding to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had alleged sufficient detail of wrongdoing by the defendant officers
to state a claim that they breached their fiduciary duties in their capacity as
officers.18 Thus, under Delaware law, officers owe the same fiduciary duties to
the corporation and its stockholders as directors.
III
SAFE HARBOR OF RELIANCE
In connection with directors’ discharge of their fiduciary duties, several
protections have developed over the years in both the MBCA and Delaware
law to limit directors’ potential liability in carrying out their duties and
decisionmaking. One such protection available to directors is a safe harbor that
applies when directors act, or choose not to act, in reliance on the records of the
corporation, the reports and opinions of officers and employees of the
corporation, or the advice of outside experts and advisors. Both the MBCA and
the General Corporation Law provide that directors will generally be protected
in reasonably relying on these resources and individuals in fulfilling their
fiduciary obligations. However, the statutes differ in whether this protection is
available to officers as well.

the corporation the same fiduciary duties as do directors.”); see, e.g., In re Walt Disney, 2004 WL
2050138, at *3; Copi of Del., Inc., 1996 WL 633302, at *5; Zirn, 1989 WL 79963, at *4; Sale, supra note 2,
at 462 n.28. But see Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 160001 (arguing that officers and directors do
not have the same fiduciary duties).
17. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 70809 (Del. 2009) (internal citation omitted); see also
Megan W. Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing an Officer’s
Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 127 (2010) (discussing the history of Delaware officers’ fiduciary
duties and issues surrounding such duties post-Gantler). In the bankruptcy context, Delaware courts
have begun to address the nature and contours of an officer’s fiduciary duties. See, e.g., In re Bridgeport
Holdings, Inc., 388 B.R. 548, 559 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (addressing fiduciary duty claims, including
oversight claims, brought against corporate officers); Miller v. MacDonald, 385 B.R. 576, 591 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2008) (stating that, in the court’s view, liability for the failure of oversight, so-called Caremark
liability, applied to directors and officers equally).
18. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 70809.
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A. Reliance Under the MBCA
Section 8.30 of the MBCA sets forth the general standards of conduct for
directors of a corporation. Included in the standards of conduct are provisions
giving directors the ability to rely on reports, statements, opinions, or other
information as well as the corporation’s officers or employees, outside advisors,
or a committee of the board of directors in discharging their duties.19 In relying
on the reports and other information of the corporation, a director must still
comply with the general standard of care, which includes assessing the
reliability and competence of the source of information upon which the director
intends to rely.20 In addition, in relying on the corporation’s officers or
employees or other individuals such as outside advisors, a director must
similarly make a determination with respect to the reliability and competence of
the source.21 However, when a director does not otherwise have knowledge that
would make reliance unwarranted, he or she will be protected in relying on
information, opinions, reports, or statements of the officers, advisors, or experts
of the corporation in meeting the standards of conduct expected of directors
under the MBCA.
The MBCA affords similar protection to officers with respect to their
reliance upon the records and reports of the corporation or other employees,
advisors, and experts. Section 8.42(c) of the MBCA provides that
[i]n discharging his or her duties, an officer who does not have knowledge that makes
reliance unwarranted is entitled to rely on . . . (2) information, opinions, reports or
statements, including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or
presented by one or more employees of the corporation whom the officer reasonably
believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented or by legal counsel,
public accountants, or other persons retained by the corporation as to matters
involving skills or expertise the officer reasonably believes are matters (i) within the
particular person’s professional or expert competence or (ii) as to which the particular
22
person merits confidence.

Accordingly, an officer will be protected in relying on any other employee
of the corporation and the reports and records prepared and presented by such
person, if the officer has a reasonable belief that such employee is reliable and
competent in the matters he or she presented.23 When an officer is relying on an

19. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(e)(f) (2008).
20. See id. § 8.30 cmt. 5.
21. See id. § 8.30 cmt. 6.
22. Id. § 8.42(c).
23. See id. The Official Comment to section 8.42 of the MBCA makes reference to the Official
Comment to section 8.30 in describing an officer’s ability to rely on the reports of employees or outside
advisors or experts. See id. § 8.42 cmt. at 8-348. The Official Comment to section 8.30 of the MBCA
describes how to determine whether a person is “reliable” or “competent.” See id. § 8.30 cmt. 6. In
determining whether a person is “reliable,” an officer can consider “the individual’s background
experience and scope of responsibility within the corporation in gauging the individual’s familiarly and
knowledge respecting the subject matter and . . . the individual’s record and reputation for honesty,
care and ability in discharging responsibilities which he or she undertakes.” Id. In determining whether
a person is “competent” an officer can consider the same factors as he or she would consider with
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advisor or expert retained by the corporation, the officer must reasonably
believe that the matters presented by such advisor or expert are within that
person’s professional or expert competence or are matters on which the
particular advisor or expert merits confidence.24 The MBCA’s concept of
“expert competence” encompasses a much broader variety of qualifications
than other corporate statutes, because the MBCA does not limit a person’s
expert competence to the qualification under the Securities Act of 1933. Rather,
an officer may rely on an outside advisor even when “skills or expertise of a
technical nature is not a prerequisite, or whe[n] the person’s professional or
expert competence has not been established, so long as the director reasonably
believes the person merits confidence.”25 While section 8.42 of the MBCA
provides reliance protection to officers similar to that extended to directors
under section 8.30, the Official Comment to the MBCA cautions that an
officer’s ability to rely on others may be more limited in certain circumstances
based on his or her familiarity with the corporation’s business and affairs.26
B. Reliance Under the General Corporation Law
The Delaware analog to sections 8.30(e) and 8.30(f) of the MBCA is found
in section 141(e) of the General Corporation Law. Recognizing that boards of
directors, in discharging their duties, frequently must rely on both internal
reports from management and external reports from experts, the Delaware
legislature adopted section 2041 of the Revised Code of Delaware of 1935, the
precursor to section 141(e), to provide that a director of a corporation
shall in the performance of his duties be fully protected in relying in good faith
upon . . . reports made to the corporation by any of its officials or by an independent
certified public accountant, or by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the
27
Board of Directors . . . .

The provisions of original section 2041 remained over the years, and in 1987,
the legislature modernized the statute, which had by then been reclassified as
section 141(e), “to broaden the language to encompass specifically all categories
of outside experts and to bring reports by non-officer employees within its
ambit.”28

respect to reliability of a person. In addition, if a person’s expertise is relevant to the decision, an officer
should consider the technical skills or knowledge of the person as well. Id.
24. Id. § 8.42(c). In evaluating the expertise of an outside advisor to the corporation, an officer may
take into account a wide variety of qualifications, including where the officer reasonably believes that
the person merits confidence, even in the absence of establishing the person’s professional or expert
competence. See id. § 8.30 cmt. 6.
25. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 6 (2008).
26. See id. § 8.42 cmt. at 8-348.
27. See 44 Del. Laws 423 (1943).
28. See DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 1 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §
15.06[2] at 15-45 (Supp. 2009); see also S. 93, 134th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Del. 1987) (official
commentary) (stating that the purpose of the amendment was “to clarify that directors may rely in
good faith upon all corporate records, reports of employees and committees of the board and the
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In its current form, section 141(e) “fully protect[s]” directors who, in
carrying out their duties, rely in good faith on certain corporate information and
individuals that have been selected with reasonable care. Specifically, section
141(e) provides:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by the
board of directors, shall, in the performance of such member’s duties, be fully
protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such
information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of
the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other
person’s professional or expert competence and who has been selected with
29
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.

Thus, in discharging their duty to be informed in making decisions on behalf
of the corporation, directors, by statute, have no additional duty to research or
verify independently that the corporate reports or the underlying data upon
which they rely are accurate.
Accordingly, under section 141(e), in appropriate circumstances, directors
are entitled to place great reliance on the records of the corporation and the
reports of experts. This protection, however, is not without limits. In order to
secure the protections of section 141(e), a director must (1) be relying in good
faith, (2) have a reasonable belief in the professional or expert competence of
the person presenting the report, and (3) have selected such person with
reasonable care.30 Further, directors cannot rely exclusively on experts’
collective experience and expertise to demonstrate an informed decision; they
are only “entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance” on expert advice.31 To that
end, directors are duty-bound to make a “reasonable inquiry” into any reports
submitted to the board.32
Unlike the MBCA, the General Corporation Law does not extend the
protections in section 141(e) to officers. As a result, officers of Delaware
corporations do not, at least statutorily, receive any safe harbor protection

written or oral advice or opinions of any professionals and experts who are selected with reasonable
care and are reasonably believed to be acting within the scope of their expertise”).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2010); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
964 A.2d 106, 132 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[D]irectors of Delaware corporations are fully protected in relying
in good faith on the reports of officers and experts.”); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846
A.2d 963, 985 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Section 141(e) of Delaware’s corporation law provides that directors
are protected from a breach of the duty of care ‘when the directors reasonably believe the information
upon which they rely has been presented by an expert “selected with reasonable care” and is within
that person’s “professional or expert competence.”’”) (quoting In re Cheyenne Software, Inc., No.
14941, 1996 WL 652765, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1996)). For a discussion of the history of section 141(e)
and the Delaware courts’ application of the statute, see Thomas A. Uebler, Reinterpreting Section
141(e) of Delaware’s General Corporation Law: Why Interested Directors Should be “Fully Protected”
in Relying on Expert Advice, 65 BUS. LAW. 1023 (2010) (discussing Delaware case law where section
141(e) provides directors with a defense to liability in duty of care cases and asserting that section
141(e), by its express terms, should also provide a defense to liability in certain duty of loyalty cases).
30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2010).
31. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875, 880 (Del. 1985).
32. See id. at 875.
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when they rely in good faith on the corporate records and reports and the
advice of experts to the corporation in carrying out their fiduciary duties.
IV
CONSIDERATIONS IN EXTENDING RELIANCE PROTECTION TO OFFICERS
The board of directors of a corporation is tasked with the ultimate
responsibility for the management of a corporation.33 However, given the size
and complexity of many modern corporations, actual operational control by the
board of directors, itself, is frequently not feasible. Recognizing this reality, the
MBCA and the General Corporation Law provide the board with the ability to
delegate certain powers and responsibilities to the chief executive officer, chief
financial officer, and other executive officers of the corporation.34 The primary
functions of management of the corporation generally are delegated to these
senior executive officers. In turn, those members of senior management may
then delegate to other officers, employees, and agents of the corporation certain
responsibilities with respect to the day to day operations of the corporation.35
For example, the chief financial officer of a large public corporation may
delegate responsibility for compiling the comprehensive financial statements
and conducting the audits of the corporation’s various business segments to
other senior financial officers or senior audit officers who will then report back
to the chief financial officer. This delegation further down the management
hierarchy is often necessary for a large public corporation to be able to run
effectively and efficiently. The MBCA acknowledges the reality of the

33. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010);
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) (“One of the fundamental principles of the Delaware
General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation are managed by or under
the direction of its board of directors.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010)).
34. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) & cmt. at 8-5 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2010); see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 cmt. a (1994) (citation omitted) (“It is generally recognized that the board
of directors is not expected to operate the business. Even under statutes providing that the business and
affairs shall be ‘managed’ by the board of directors, it is recognized that actual operation is a function
of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to overseeing such operation[s] . . . .”);
Grimes v. Donald, No. 13358, 1995 WL 54441, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995) (“[G]iven the large,
complex organizations through which modern, multi-function business corporations often operate, the
law recognizes that corporate boards, comprised as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating
less than all of their attention to that role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but
may satisfy their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and
plans and monitoring performance. . . . Thus Section 141(a) of [the] DGCL expressly permits a board of
directors to delegate managerial duties to officers of the corporation, except to the extent that the
corporation’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws may limit or prohibit such a delegation.”), aff’d, 673
A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996). Delegation by the board of directors is not limited or restricted to senior
executive officers; however, practically speaking, based on the corporate management hierarchy at
many corporations, most delegation and directives from the board will go to these senior officers.
35. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 cmt. at 8-5 (2008) (“[I]n many other corporations, the
business and affairs are managed ‘under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of’ the board of
directors, since operational management is delegated to executive officers and other professional
managers.”).

BALOTTI & SHANER

170

12/25/2010

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:161

management of the corporate entity and that the delegation, and subsequent
reliance, by officers and directors alike is a practice that frequently takes place
and is of practical necessity for the modern corporation to function.36 The
MBCA thus addresses the implications of officers’ delegation and reliance on
other persons in discharging their duties to the corporation. By providing
officers with protection when they reasonably rely on the information, opinions,
reports, or statements of other employees or outside advisors and experts of the
corporation, the MBCA’s provisions encourage proper delegation, oversight,
and reliance by officers. Further, providing officers with a safe harbor in
reasonably relying on other individuals encourages officers to take advantage of
all of the resources available to them in order to be fully informed and to fulfill
properly their fiduciary obligations.
The MBCA’s approach finds support not only in practice, but also in policy.
For instance, one of the policy considerations underlying the reliance safe
harbor afforded to directors is that, given the complex situations and business
issues boards must address, in order to meet their fiduciary obligations to be
fully informed, directors often must rely on lawyers, financial advisors,
economists, and other specialized experts to advise them. By offering protection
to directors when they properly rely on the statements, opinions, and reports of
outside advisors and experts, reliance statutes encourage directors to seek the
appropriate advice to be fully informed in taking action and making decisions
on behalf of the corporation. Indeed, the Delaware courts have recognized that
“[d]irectors of Delaware corporations quite properly delegate responsibility to
qualified experts in a host of circumstances.”37 Moreover, as one corporate
commentator has put it, “[e]xpert consultation inspired by a perceived need to
know on the part of the board is obviously constructive and indispensible.”38
Officers are likewise faced with complex business decisions and issues that they
may not have the knowledge or industry-specific experience to fully understand.
For example, while an officer such as the chief executive officer has a more
intimate knowledge of the business and greater access to the records and day to
day operations of the corporation than a director, the chief executive officer
does not necessarily have thorough knowledge and expertise with respect to all
aspects and areas of the corporation’s business. As a result, the chief executive
officer may not be able to make a fully informed decision or recommendation
36. See id. § 8.42(c)(1); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 THE
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.15[B], at 4-114 (3d ed. Supp.
2010) (“Protected reliance on officers’ reports, when those reports are facially credible, is a practical
necessity for a board of directors to function.”).
37. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000); see also McMullen
v. Beran, No. 16493, 1999 WL 1135146, at *4 n.21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1999) (“Delaware law recognizes
the appropriateness of directors relying on the advice of experts when specialized judgment is required
as part of a business judgment.”); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch.
1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (stating that relying on an experienced advisor is not only
allowed, but is “evidence [of] good faith and the overall fairness of the process”).
38. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for
Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1487 (1984).
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to the board on his or her own, in particular when doing so would require
specialized knowledge or judgment. Accordingly, an officer may, and in many
cases should, turn to outside legal, financial, and other advisors to assist in
providing reports and other information so that the officer can be fully
informed in discharging his or her duties. Extending a safe harbor to officers
when they properly rely on experts reinforces the appropriate actions by
officers to be fully informed in making business decisions and reporting to and
advising the board of directors.
Although the foregoing reasons can be cited in support of extending the
statutory reliance protections afforded to directors to officers, there are also
inherent differences in the roles and responsibilities of directors and officers in
managing a corporation, which suggest that, consistent with the General
Corporation Law’s approach, these protections should not be extended to
officers. Even though the fiduciary duties of directors and officers have been
found to be the same, the functions and roles of directors and officers within the
corporation are fundamentally different.39 Directors are charged with
overseeing the management of the corporation,40 while officers are charged with
running the day to day operations and reporting back to the board.41
Accordingly, with greater access to the books and records of the corporation
and a more intimate knowledge of the business and affairs of the corporation,
one of the primary functions of officers is to be fully informed with respect to
the corporate enterprise and to report to the board. Under Delaware law, for
example, corporate commentators have inferred a duty to inform the board of
directors based upon the statutorily mandated information exchange that must
take place between officers and directors for a corporation to function.42
Furthermore, section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law provides that
“[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”43 Thus,
section 141(a) impliedly requires officers in charge of the corporation’s day to
day operations to be informed so as to be able to convey sufficient information
to the members of the board of directors to enable them to direct the
management of the corporation appropriately. In addition, the Delaware Court
of Chancery has commented specifically on an officer’s duty of disclosure to the
board. The court has recognized that there is little question that “in certain
circumstances an officer of a Delaware corporation has a duty to speak without
being asked to do so.”44
39. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1601 (asserting that the institutional function and legal
roles within the corporation are not the same for directors and officers).
40. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
41. See Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 340 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating
that officers “have the far more onerous task of operating the company each day”).
42. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 226.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
44. Greco v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., No. 16801, 1999 WL 1261446, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb.
12, 1999).
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These informational and disclosure requirements and duties of officers are
further evidenced by statutory provisions such as section 141(e) of the General
Corporation Law and section 8.30(d)–(f) of the MBCA, both of which protect
directors from personal liability resulting from corporate action taken in
reliance on information provided by officers.45 The assumption underlying the
safe harbor provided by these statutes is that the officers are the persons with
the most intimate knowledge and best access to information regarding the
corporation and its business.46 Accordingly, lawmakers have decided that
directors may properly rely on these individuals in discharging their duty to be
informed in making decisions and be protected in doing so. Because directors
are entitled to such protection, officers should arguably be held to a strict
standard of care and requirement to be fully informed. As a result, allowing
officers, in turn, to receive a similar safe harbor in relying on other individuals
in meeting their standard of care and duty to be informed would undermine the
rationale underlying the statutory protections provided to directors.
Finally, in evaluating the merits of the differing approaches of the MBCA
and General Corporation Law, one should keep in mind that the protections
afforded to officers under the MBCA only address the nature and quality of
information upon which an officer is entitled to rely. The benefit that officers
receive under section 8.42(c) of the MBCA is that they are not required to
research or verify independently that the corporate reports or the underlying
data or individuals upon which or whom they rely are accurate. These statutes
do not, however, obviate the need for officers to inform themselves fully of the
relevant information and details of an issue.47 Rather, only reasonable good
faith reliance is protected. As provided in section 8.42(c) of the MBCA, officers
are only entitled to rely on employees, outside advisors, and experts if the
officer “reasonably believes [such individuals] to be reliable and competent.”48
Moreover, the MBCA also recognizes that
[a]n officer’s ability to rely on others in meeting the standards [of conduct required
under the MBCA] may be more limited, depending upon the circumstances of the
particular case, than the measure and scope of reliance permitted a director . . . in view

45. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(d)–(f).
46. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 36, § 4.15[B] (“Management is often the bestinformed source of the business of the company and the opportunities that might confront it. Thus, a
director relying in good faith on such reports should be entitled to the full protection of the business
judgment rule.”); see also In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(describing officers as the “members with the best capacity to help management craft and implement a
sound business plan”).
47. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 5–6 (2008); see cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 874 (Del. 1985); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 770 n.550 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“The role of experts under § 141(e) is to assist the board’s decision making—not supplant it.”).
48. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(c)(1)–(2) (2008); see cf. Cantor v. Perelman, 235 F. Supp. 2d
377, 38788 (D. Del. 2002); Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000);
Grubb v. Bagley, No. 13882-NC, 1998 WL 92224, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1998) (“The statute affords a
defense only if the board acted reasonably and in good faith.”).
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of the greater obligation the officer may have to be familiar with the affairs of the
49
corporation.

Thus, for officers such as the chief financial officer, who have specialized
expertise and acumen in certain matters or a more intimate knowledge of
specific aspects of the corporation’s business, the ability to be protected in
relying on reports and records of others in discharging his or her duties may be
more closely circumscribed.
V
CONCLUSION
Under both the MBCA and Delaware law, directors and officers owe
essentially the same fiduciary duties to a corporation and its stockholders.
While officers have the same fiduciary obligations as directors, they do not
always benefit from the same statutory protections that directors may receive.50
One such statutory protection is the safe harbor afforded to directors when they
reasonably rely on the books and records of the corporation, or the reports,
statements, and presentations of the officers, advisors, and experts of the
corporation. The MBCA and the General Corporation Law take two different
approaches to whether the reliance safe harbor that directors receive should be
similarly available to officers. The MBCA, recognizing the reality and
practicality of the delegation, and accordingly reliance, that takes place in
managing a corporation, extends a reliance safe harbor to officers. By contrast,
based on the inherent differences in the roles and responsibilities that directors
and officers occupy in corporate management, the approach of the General
Corporation Law is not to extend a statutory reliance safe harbor to officers.
While this article only discusses the narrow issue of whether officers should
receive a safe harbor when they rely on other individuals and resources, the
fiduciary duties and standards of liability applicable to officers is a prominent
topic for corporate commentators and policymakers. As a result, the broader

49. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 cmt. at 8-348 (2008). The Delaware courts have indicated that
they may take into account the specialized skills of a particular individual in concluding whether that
individual has met his or her fiduciary obligations. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *3940 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). Accordingly, an officer’s specialized
knowledge or expertise may limit such officer’s ability to be protected in relying on the reports and
opinions of advisors and experts.
50. For example, under both the MBCA and the General Corporation Law, the ability to exculpate
for monetary breaches of fiduciary duty is limited to directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2010) (providing exculpation for “the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders”) (emphasis added); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008) (providing exculpation
for “the liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders”) (emphasis added); see also
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) (noting that the protections in section 102(b)(7)
do not extend to officers); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1275 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same).
Commentators have also noted the greater exposure faced by non-director officers when subject to the
same fiduciary duties as directors. See, e.g., Johnson & Garvis, supra note 4, at 1107 n.9; Johnson &
Millon, supra note 4, at 1639; John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, Commanding Officers:
The Fiduciary Duties of Officers under Delaware Law, INSIGHTS, June 2008, at 2, 7 n.36.
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issue of whether corporate officers should receive the same, if any, statutory
protections as directors, is an important one.

